This article presents a microstructure model of liquidity provision in which a specialist with market power competes against a competitive limit order book. General solutions, comparative statics and examples are provided first with uninformative orders and then when order flows are informative. The model is also used to address two optimal market design issues. The first is the effect of "tick" size -for example, eighths versus decimal pricing -on market liquidity. Institutions trading large blocks have a larger optimal tick size than small retail investors, but both prefer a tick size strictly greater than zero. Second, a hybrid specialist/limit order market (like the NYSE) provides better liquidity to small retail and institutional trades, but a pure limit order market (like the Paris Bourse) may offer better liquidity on mid-size orders.
ages the collection of costly information and corporate control contests leading to improved resource allocation. The equilibrium liquidity in a market is the outcome of trading decisions taken by liquidity suppliers -investors who sell at prices above or buy at prices below their individual pretrade valuations of a security -and liquidity demanders -investors who trade at a premium or discount for the right to trade quickly. In a liquid market, the per-share impact of trades on prices is small. Trading affects prices because of adverse selection and/or market imperfections such as compensation for immediacy, taxes and order-processing costs, and any market power or inventory considerations of the marginal trader.
This article models the liquidity provision process in an institutional context motivated by features of the NYSE. In the model, a specialist trades strategically to maximize his profits from executing arriving market orders in the face of competition from limit orders from offexchange liquidity suppliers. These value traders do not need to trade per se, but they do submit orders if their expected profit is positive.
Limit orders are price-contingent orders to sell (buy) if the price rises above (falls below) a prespecified limit price. As on the NYSE, price and public priority must be respected in that all public limit orders at prices at or below (above) the price at which the specialist proposes to sell (buy) must first be executed in full. The drawback of a limit order is that value traders only know the ex ante distribution of market orders when they submit their orders. In contrast, the specialist can wait to see the realized size of the arriving market order before deciding how to trade. Waiting is valuable if order submission is costly due to brokerage fees or to possible intervening revisions in the security's value (i.e., from public announcements or informative order flows).
The main results from this model are the following: 1. The value traders' and specialist's equilibrium strategies have a simple recursive structure. The general solution is analytic up to the evaluation of an inverse cumulative density (with uninformative order flows) or an inverse conditional expectation (with informative orders).
2. Analytic solutions are provided in the special cases of uninformative exponential (truncated or untruncated) and uniformly distributed market orders.
3. The relation between tick size and liquidity is non-monotone and discontinuous.
4. Retail and institutional investors have heterogeneous preferences about the optimal tick size with small investors favoring smaller ticks and large investors favoring larger ticks. Both, however, prefer discrete over continuous pricing. There are also strong grounds to conjecture that mid-size investors prefer some discreteness in prices, too.
5. Small retail and large institutional investors prefer hybrid specialist/limit order markets (such as the NYSE), while some mid-size investors may prefer pure limit order markets (like the Paris Bourse).
This article is closely related to four lines of prior work. First, in a very important article, Rock (1996) solves for the equilibrium limit order book when off-exchange investors (with a risk-bearing advantage) compete with risk-averse competitive specialists (with an informational advantage). Byrne (1993) adapts the model to allow for price discreteness.
2 In this article, the tension between on-and offexchange liquidity providers stems from the specialist's market power rather than from risk-related inventory effects. I initially abstract from issues of price discovery, but then later add in a simple price discovery problem due to informative market order flows, as in Rock (1996) .
The second antecedent is Harris (1994a) , which empirically estimates the effect of the NYSE moving from the current pricing on "eighths" to decimal pricing. It suggests that with decimal pricing, the bid/ask spread would shrink significantly, the depth at the inside bid/ask quotes would drop, and market order volume would increase, but it cannot say how depth further into the limit order book would change. Since limit orders beyond the inside bid/ask quotes are a source of liquidity for large blocks, this is an issue of some importance to institutional and other large traders. The theory in this article does address this issue.
A third line of work concerns the role of market power in market making, as in Glosten (1989) and Leach and Madhavan (1993) . Specifically, how much market power does the advantaged position of specialists in the trading process confer? And how effectively do limit orders curb this market power?
3 Such questions -long of concern to academics and regulators -have come to the fore in the recent NASDAQ controversy. [See Wall Street Journal (1994) .] In par-2 Other equilibrium models of limit orders include Glosten (1994) , who studies competition between exchanges with limit orders but no specialist; Kumar and Seppi (1994) , who investigate optimal order placement strategies when informed and liquidity traders can use limit orders too; Chakravarty and Holden (1995) , who obtain analytic solutions to a limit order model with informed traders; Brown and Holden (1995) , who consider forms of "smart" limit orders; and the dynamic models in Foucault (1993) and Parlour (1994) . In addition, Angel (1992) , Cohen, Maier, Schwartz, and Whitcomb (1981) ; and Harris (1994b) describe optimal limit order strategies in partial equilibrium settings. For empirical evidence on limit orders see Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) , Frino and McCorry (1995) , Greene (1996) , Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) , Hollifield, Miller, and Sandas (1996) , and Kavajecz (1996) . 3 The role of competition from an on-exchange trading crowd and price continuity rules are also considered. The issue of whether knowledge of the limit order book itself gives the specialist an unfair advantage in price discovery does not arise here since my limit order book is open and limit order flows are predictable and hence uninformative.
ticular, Christie and Schultz (1994) and others suggest that allegedly wide NASDAQ spreads may in part be due to inadequate limit order priority on the NASDAQ system. The fourth work involves efforts to model the noninformational component of prices more explicitly. While Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1984 Kyle ( , 1985 profoundly deepened our understanding of the role of adverse selection, theory on noninformational liquidity effects has only recently begun -most notably in Grossman and Miller (1988) , Keim and Madhavan (1996) , Leach and Madhavan (1993) , and Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1995) -to catch up with our empirical knowledge about the transitory component of prices [e.g., see Hasbrouck (1991 Hasbrouck ( , 1993 ].
This article is organized as follows. Section 1 describes a market in which order flows are uninformative. Section 2 finds the unique equilibrium in this setting and presents some examples. Section 3 takes up optimal market design issues relating to tick size and the role of the specialist. Section 4 considers the interplay between price discovery and liquidity provision by extending the model to allow for market orders that are informative. Section 5 revisits the market design issue in this richer environment. Section 6 summarizes my findings and discusses possible extensions. All proofs are in Appendix A.
A Model without Price Discovery
Consider a liquidity provision game in a simple static market with four types of investors. An active trader demands liquidity inelastically by submitting a market order to buy/sell stock. Liquidity is supplied by (1) competitive risk neutral value traders who post limit orders from off of the exchange, (2) a single strategic specialist who clears the market subject to certain priority rules, and (3) a large trading crowd on the exchange, which (potentially) enters to provide unlimited liquidity if the profit from doing so exceeds a fixed hurdle rate.
The timing of events is depicted in Figure 1 . Value traders first submit limit orders at time 1. Some time later an active trader arrives and submits a market order either to buy a random number of shares B or to sell a random S shares. In particular, α is the probability that he buys, and F is a continuous distribution over possible volumes (i.e., B or S). The specialist then maximizes his expected profit by choosing a clean up price p * at which he clears the market after first executing any limit orders with priority (see below) and giving the crowd -which also sees B and p * but has a higher reservation price -a chance to trade ahead of him.
Prices are restricted to a discrete grid P = {. . . , p −1 , p 1 , p 2 , . . .}. I initially abstract from issues of price discovery by assuming that the potential liquidity providers -that is, the specialist, value traders, and the crowd -have a common valuation v, which is known to all investors, for the stock. 4 Prices are indexed on P by their ordinal position above or below v. If v itself is on the grid, then it is indexed as p 0 . Later in Section 4, a price discovery complication is added.
The ability of limit orders to compete against the specialist hinges on certain priority rules. As on the NYSE, the specialist must respect the price, public, and time priority of other traders' orders. Price priority means that if the specialist wants to sell (buy) at a price p * , then any limit sell (buy) orders at lower (higher) prices p < p * (p > p * ) must first be filled in full. Public priority means that any limit or trading crowd orders at p * must also be filled first. Time priority stipulates that if the limit orders (and any from the trading crowd) exceed the available market order volume, then orders at p * are executed sequentially in the order in which they arrived. When executed, limit orders trade at their posted limit price, which may be less (more) than p * . For time priority to make sense, the value traders are modeled as Bertrand competitors with stochastic arrival times. One of them randomly arrives first and -seeing an empty limit order book and knowing that other value traders will follow shortly -submits limit orders until the marginal expected profit on additional orders at each price is driven to zero.
5 Unlike on the NYSE, the limit order book here 4 The active trader clearly has a different private valuation since he is willing to trade at a discount/premium relative to v to achieve immediacy. 5 Alternatively, to avoid having a single value trader generate the entire limit order book, imagine liquidity constrained value traders arriving sequentially and each posting small limit orders until the expected profit from additional submissions is again driven to zero.
is open (i.e., publicly observable), so a value trader always knows the current depth at each price at the time she considers submitting an order.
In submitting limit orders, the value traders incur an up-front submission cost of c per share. This cost is important because it bounds depth in the limit order book, thereby giving the specialist "room" to exercise market power. Since brokerage fees, in practice, are only paid after execution, c is best interpreted as a reduced form for the idea that limit orders can be "picked off" based on information from public announcements, or, alternatively, as capturing any incremental opportunity or shoeleather costs investors bear when trading from off the exchange.
6 This cost and the fact that the probability of a market buy is α < 1 together imply that limit orders are ex ante profitable only at prices above v + c/α (for limit sells) and below v − c/(1 − α) (for buys).
The trading crowd has a slightly different constraint on their willingness to trade. They provide unlimited liquidity whenever the stock's price at time 3 differs from its value by r or more, but otherwise do not participate -that is, they buy if p * ≤ v − r and sell if p * ≥ v + r -thereby effectively bounding (when r < ∞) the scope of the specialist's market power. The premium r represents both compensation for any trading costs the crowd may incur plus its required net profit. The idea is that the crowd only recognizes or intervenes on gross mispricing (e.g., spreads of fifty cents) because it is otherwise busy carrying out a more profitable broker function.
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Since the buy and sell sides are separable and symmetric in this model, I focus expositionally on limit sells/market buys. I define p max = p j max s as the lowest price above v + r (i.e., the trading crowd's reservation price), where j max s = min(j | v + r ≤ p j ). In addition, if c/α < r (the natural case), then p min = p j min s is the lowest price above v + c/α (i.e., the starting point for limit sell orders), where j min s = min(j | v + c/α < p j ). In addition, let S 1 , S 2 , . . . denote the number of shares posted as limit sells at prices p 1 , p 2 , . . ., respectively, 6 Neither the specialist nor the crowd gives away free trading options since they can update their pricing faster than off-exchange traders to reflect any news that may arrive [as in Brown and Holden (1995) and Kumar and Seppi (1994) ] after limit orders are submitted but before market orders arrive. Allowing the ex ante costs c 1 , c 2 , . . . to depend on the price p 1 , p 2 , . . . where a limit order is posted is straightforward. While the idea that off-exchange investors are at a cost disadvantage seems reasonable, little changes qualitatively if the specialist does pay c except that intraspread trading is then confined to prices between v + c and v + c/α (see below). 7 The crowd can be reinterpreted as an "upstairs" market for large blocks where r is the premium/discount demanded by potential counterparties, as in Keim and Madhavan (1996) . However, for the upstairs market to attract positive volume, the specialist's maximum position must be bounded since otherwise he will always undercut the upstairs price if p 1 < v + r .
Figure 2
Restrictions on the specialist's clean up price imposed by the limit book and the crowd and let Q j = j i=1 S i be the cumulative depths at or below p j . All order quantities B, S j , and Q j are unsigned (non-negative) volumes.
The specialist's two advantages -that is, not paying the incremental cost c, and trading after he sees the realized volume B rather than based on ex ante expectations -make him the low-cost liquidity provider in this model. However, he provides liquidity at favorable prices only if he has an incentive to do so, which is precisely what the price and public priority rules accomplish. They force the specialist to undercut competing liquidity providers.
Competition from the limit book and the threat of entry by the crowd constrain the specialist's market power in a number of ways. One immediate way is that he never sells at a p * less than p 1 (if the book starts at p min = p 1 ) or p min−1 = p j min s −1 (if it starts at p min > p 1 ). The p min−1 case follows from the fact that the specialist only needs to undercut the book by one tick to get small trades. Similarly, he cannot ask more than p max−1 = p j max s −1 and still undercut the trading crowd on large trades.
This presupposes, of course, that the grid P includes (as in Figure 2 ) prices in the appropriate intervals. Otherwise, the specialist may be unable to trade given price and public priority. In particular, if he cannot undercut low limit sells (i.e., if P ∩ (v, v + c/α] is empty), then he only provides liquidity as a "counterparty of last resort" on larger trades B > S 1 . If he cannot undercut the trading crowd [i.e., if P ∩ (v, v + r ) is empty], then he cannot trade at all.
Consider the specialist's formal order execution problem. Given a market order to buy B shares, he maximizes his profit by clearing the market at the price p * that solves
Restricting the choice set to prices between v and the trading crowd's reservation price p max simply recognizes that (1) the specialist requires a positive profit to sell, and (2) failure to deter entry by the crowd drives his volume (and hence profits) to zero. The "min" term reflects the fact that the specialist never buys from the book or crowd at p * > v. A perhaps less obvious point is that under his optimal strategy, the posted limit orders S j at each price p j (except p 1 ) are executed either in full or not at all. 9 Another useful result is a monotonicity property that p * is weakly increasing in volume.
The key to the specialist's problem is that, in raising p * , the benefit of a greater profit per share p * − v must be balanced against the cost of a reduced number of shares B − i s.t. p i ≤p * S i left over for him after executing competing orders with priority.
10 For example, if the market buy is big enough to fill limit orders at prices p 1 through p j (i.e., B > S 1 + · · · + S j ), the specialist's profit from selling at p * = p j −1 is
and from selling at p j is
Comparing Equation (3) with Equation (2) shows that he earns more 8 Price continuity rules have virtually no effect on this problem since the specialist, after doing the bulk of his trades at p * , can always use the last few shares he sells to "walk" back down the price schedule to recenter prices at v again. 9 A partial fill at p * > p 1 would mean that the specialist went too far into the book and exhausted the supply of market orders without trading himself. However, a partial fill of limit orders at p 1 is possible since it is not profitable to undercut the lowest price above v. Thus, how many of the S 1 limit orders are executed is beyond the specialist's control in that it depends entirely on the volume B. 10 The model differs from the "dominant firm" model in that the competitive fringe's supply schedule is derived given that limit orders trade at their posted inframarginal prices p j ≤ p * rather than all at the marginal price p * .
trading at p j than at p j −1 if and only if the market order is sufficiently large:
As is shown below, in equilibrium, comparisons with the adjacent prices alone suffice to determine the specialist's optimal trading rule. In principle, however, deciding whether p j solves Equation (1) requires checking not only that trading at the adjacent prices p j −1 or p j +1 is less profitable, but also that trading at any other price is less profitable. For example, the specialist's profit at p k < p j −1 ,
is less than Equation (3) if and only if
Monotonicity of p * from Proposition 1 lets us represent the specialist's strategy in terms of minimum volume thresholdŝ 
so thatŜ j = S * j for j > 1. The "inf" notation used in Equations (7) and (8) simply reflects a convention that the specialist sets p * (B) ≥ p j > p 1 only when B >Ŝ j . Pricing and limit order execution at p 1 is somewhat different. Neither the specialist nor the crowd can profitably undercut p 1 , so full execution of S 1 depends simply on whether B ≥ S 1 . Thus,Ŝ 1 = S 1 and S can readily calculate the expected profit from additional orders. In equilibrium, their total order submissions S 1 , S 2 , . . . are guided by the marginal expected profit from an additional limit order at each p j :
where αF (B >Ŝ j ) is the probability of a market order B arriving that is large enough to trigger execution of all limit sells at p j . 11 Since value traders are risk-neutral, competitive, and do not need to trade per se, they simply submit limit orders opportunistically until any positive expected marginal profits from supplying liquidity are eliminated.
Putting the behavioral assumptions about the specialist, values traders, and trading crowd together gives the following definition. Before continuing, a brief comparison of this model with the competitive limit order models of Rock (1996) and Byrne (1993) may be helpful. The first difference is that a noninformational spread arises here from the strategic execution of orders by a monopolistic specialist in competition with a competitive fringe rather than from risk-related inventory effects. The second is the absence of adverse selection. Limit orders are costly so far simply because of the submission fee c.
Results
This model is tractable because, in equilibrium, the specialist's execution strategyŜ j takes a particularly simple form. To appreciate this, consider first his strategy against an arbitrary limit order book. Plotting the specialist's profits π 1 , π 2 , and π 3 from selling at p 1 , p 2 , and p 3 , respectively, against volume B, one sees that if the depth S 3 is high (as in Figure 3a) , then the specialist sells at p 1 if B ≤ S 1,2 , at price p 2 if S 1,2 < B ≤ S 2,3 , and at p 3 only if S 2,3 < B. In contrast, if S 3 is low (as in Figure 3b ), then he clears the market at p 1 until B > S 1,3 at which point his profit-maximizing price jumps over p 2 directly to p 3 . Thus, a priori, the relative ranking of the crossing points S 1,2 , S 2,3 , and S 1,3 is ambiguous. With only three prices, this is manageable, but having
Figure 3a
Specialist's profit with big depth S 3 The lines π 1 , π 2 , and π 3 give the specialist's profit from selling at clean up prices p 1 , p 2 , and p 3 , respectively, given possible buy volumes B in excess of the cumulative limit sells Q 1 , Q 2 , and Q 3 at each of these prices. His optimal strategy is the upper envelope of these lines. The execution thresholdsŜ 1 ,Ŝ 2 , andŜ 3 are just the depth S 1 and the crossing points S 1,2 (for lines π 1 and π 2 ) and S 2,3 (for lines π 2 and π 3 ).
to check all pairwise comparisons with decimal pricing to determine theŜ j would be a computational mess.
A related complication (again with arbitrary books) is that greater depth at higher prices may or may not affect the execution threshold for limit orders at lower prices. In Figure 3b , a small increase in S 3 moves the profit line π 3 slightly to the right, thereby raising the crossing point S 1,3 and thus thresholdsŜ 3 andŜ 2 ; whereas in Figure 3a , increasing S 3 has no effect onŜ 2 (since it is determined by S 1,2 rather than S 1,3 ).
This complexity is worrisome since solving for the equilibrium involves finding a fixed point. The value traders' total limit order submissions S 1 , S 2 , . . . depend through e s1 , e s2 , . . . on the specialist's execution thresholdsŜ 1 ,Ŝ 2 , . . ., which depend, in turn, on the submitted limit orders S 1 , S 2 , . . .. Fortunately, the next proposition cuts this Gordian knot.
Proposition 2. In equilibrium, if S j > 0 limit orders are posted at a price p j , then S j +1 > 0 limit orders are also posted at p j +1 , provided p j +1 < p max . In addition, given the equilibrium depths S 1 , S 2 , . . . in
Figure 3b
Specialist's profit with small depth S 3 This figure is identical to Figure 3a except that depth S 3 is much less than in Figure 3a . Consequently, the execution thresholds areŜ 1 = S 1 andŜ 2 =Ŝ 3 = S 1,3 < S 1,2 .
the limit order book, the specialist's execution thresholds are just the adjacent price crossing pointŝ
The intuition is the following. Take, for example, j = 2 and suppose S 2 > 0. If S 3 is too small, as in Figure 3b , then value traders can increase their expected profit by shifting > 0 limit orders from p 2 up to p 3 . This is because (1) the realized profit conditional on execution at p 3 is greater than at p 2 , and (2) the execution probability is the same as long as S 1,2 ≥ S 1,3 . In particular, sinceŜ 2 =Ŝ 3 = S 1,3 , the common threshold from Equation (6) depends only on the sum S 2 + S 3 and not on the levels of S 2 and S 3 separately. Furthermore, S 1,3 stays to the left of S 1,2 (as in Figure 3b ) with S 2 − at p 2 and S 3 + at p 3 , as long as
. Thus, a depth S 3 that is too small is inconsistent with equilibrium since it implies e s3 > e s2 = 0.
12 To zero out the marginal expected profit at p 3 , we need sufficient depth S 3 so that [from Equations (9) and (10)] limit orders at p 2 are sometimes executed when limits at p 3 are not or F (B >Ŝ 2 ) > F (B >Ŝ 3 ). Thus, in equilibrium, the book looks like Figure 3a rather than (the more complicated) Figure 3b .
This result is important because it lets us construct our equilibrium recursively. Starting at price p 1 and working our way up, the depth S j at each price p j is either zero [if e sj (0) ≤ 0] or can be calculated by (1) inverting the zero profit condition e sj (Ŝ j ) = 0 to obtain the breakeven thresholdŜ j and then (2) invertingŜ j = S j −1,j from Equation (10) -together with the previously determined depths S 1 , . . . , S j−1 -for the depth S j that induces this threshold. In particular, Proposition 2 assures us that depths S k at higher prices p k > p j do not affectŜ j and S j in equilibrium.
At this point, some notation is needed. Let H (F ) be the inverse of the upper-tail cumulative probability F (B > z ) and define
In words, H j is the number that sets the marginal probability of execution
, when this is a proper probability), which is what e sj (Ŝ j ) = 0 requiresŜ j to do. Proposition 3. The equilibrium limit order book has a recursive structure such that
at prices p j < p max and S j = 0 thereafter, provided that p 1 < p max . The specialist's execution strategy is simplŷ
If instead p 1 = p max , then the specialist never trades, and S 1 = H 1 and S j = 0 for all j > 1.
There are several things to notice. First, the equilibrium is unique since it is constructed recursively. That is, S 1 is unique and, given S 1 , then S 2 is unique, and so on. Second, γ j ≤ 1 is shorthand for the reciprocal of the
term multiplying S j in the expression forŜ j in Equation (10). Intuitively, a small γ j reflects reduced limit order depth due to more aggressive specialist undercutting of the book [i.e.,Ŝ j exceeds the cumulative depth Q j by S j (
. Third, when S 1 > 0, the inframarginal limit sells at p 1 actually earn positive expected profits. This is because their probability of execution is higher than that of the (break-even) marginal sell at p 1 , due to the possibility of partial execution based on time priority when B < S 1 . In contrast, inframarginal orders at p j > p 1 simply break even in expectation since they are executed either in toto along with the marginal order at p j (i.e., when B >Ŝ j ) or not at all. Fourth, the posted bid/ask spread reflects orders in the book (i.e., p ask = p min ) since my specialist does not post quotes up-front. However, if the grid includes prices between v and v + c/α, then he engages in intraspread trading at p min−1 to undercut the book whenever B < H ( c/α p min −v ) -thereby tightening the effective spread for small trades relative to the posted spread. Intraspread trading is an attractive feature of the model, given its prevalence on the NYSE. 13 Fifth, a competitive market (i.e., p * = p 1 for all B) is a special case when c = 0 and/or r ≤ p 1 − v. Sixth, the cumulative depth Q j is a weighted average of the intervening
14 This in turn leads to Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. If a distribution F first-order stochastic dominates distribution F and/or the adjusted cost c /α < c/α, then the market with F and c /α is more liquid in that cumulative depth is greater (Q j ≥ Q j for all j ), execution thresholds are higher (Ŝ j ≥Ŝ j for all j ), and the book is deeper at p min (S min ≥ S min ).
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13 Shapiro (1993) reports that 66% of all trades occur between the bid and the ask when the spread is more than 1 8
. In Chakravarty and Holden (1995) , intraspread trades arise from "liquidity discovery" by off-exchange investors. The two models can be distinguished empirically since intraspread trades there involve public orders meeting public orders, while here the specialist is on one of the sides. 14 If the tick size p j − p j −1 is everywhere a constant , and p 1 = v + q (i.e., possibly a fraction q of a tick above v),
, and the cumulative depths at p j > p 1 simplify to
. 15 The effect, for example, of c/α on S j at prices p j > p min is hard to sign since
can go either way, depending on whether The first result says markets are more liquid when submission costs are low and/or large market orders are frequent. Thus, while large trades use up liquidity when they arrive, a high probability of large trades actually attracts liquidity ex ante. The second result on the boundedness of the book is important for market design in Section 3.
The solution in Proposition 3 is "almost" analytic in that the functional form of the inverse distribution function H is still needed. In certain parametric cases, this is available. However, even without closed forms for H , equilibria are readily calculated numerically.
Examples. Closed-form solutions for H exist in three special cases, where the market buy B is (1) exponentially distributed with parameter θ such that
in which case the inverse distribution function is
(2) truncated exponential with an upper bound K such that
and hence
Substituting these expressions in Proposition 3 gives the desired strategies. For example, suppose volume is untruncated exponential with a mean (and standard deviation) of θ shares. 16 If the tick size p j − p j −1 is a constant with p 1 = v +q > v +c/α (where 0 < q ≤ 1 allows for p 1 's less than a full tick above v), then, in equilibrium, the limit order book is
where
An interesting feature of this solution is that the book's depth at prices above p 1 just depends on the ratio q and the ordinal ranking of prices j (i.e., second, third, etc. above v), but surprisingly not on the tick size (e.g., whether p j is $0.05 or $0.50 above p j −1 , as long as p j < v + r ), the probability α, or even the submission cost c (i.e., beyond the stipulation c/α < q ). Figure 4 shows the limit book (in the first column) and the execution thresholds (in the second) for the following parameters: stock value v = $20, probability of a buy α = 0.5, expected volume θ = 25 round lots, a constant tick = p j − p j −1 = $0.125 with the grid centered at p 0 = v (i.e., q = 1), and a crowd hurdle rate r = $0.50. The submission cost c = $0.019 per share was calibrated to match the 1994 NYSE specialist participation rate (i.e., specialist volume to total volume) of 8. A general property of the clean up price (illustrated by this example) is that p * (B) -due to its monotonicity and boundedness -is concave in B close to p max−1 . This is consistent with empirical evidence in Keim and Madhavan (1996, Empirical issues. The model is suitable for structural estimation on tractability grounds and since it distinguishes -as do NYSE (TORQ) or Paris Bourse audit data -between arriving orders and the ensu-
Figure 4 A numerical example of limit orders and thresholds with exponential market orders
This figure gives the equilibrium depths S 1 , . . . , S 3 and thresholdsŜ 1 , . . . ,Ŝ 3 (in round lots) for a market where the stock value v = $20, the probability of a buy α = 0.5, the expected volume θ = 25 round lots, the price grid is centered at p 0 = v with a constant tick size = p j − p j −1 = $0.125, and the crowd hurdle rate is r = $0.50. The submission cost c = $0.019 per share was calibrated to match the 1994 NYSE specialist participation rate of 8.6%.
ing sequence of transactions with the book and specialist. Beyond this, the model (even in this simple symmetric information form) is capable of explaining a number of cross-sectional and intertemporal patterns in specialist participation rates and profits. For example, the finding in Madhavan and Sofianos (1994, Table 5 ) that wider spreads are correlated with higher specialist participation rates is consistent with heterogeneity in c. In particular, if c proxies for the ex ante cost of being adversely "picked off" (see footnote 6), then stocks where p min > p 1 (i.e., where c is big due to infrequent order arrivals or volatile announcements) will have more specialist undercutting (and hence higher participation rates) than stocks where p min = p 1 (i.e., where c is low). In addition, the model may be able to replicate significant cross-sectional relationships between stocks' empirical volume distributions F and specialist participation [see Madhavan and Sofianos (1994 , Table 3) ]. In particular, more mid-size volume implies deeper books (reducing the specialist's share of volume), while more blocks B >Ŝ max−1 imply more trades in which the specialist's share B − Q max−1 is large compared with the bounded liquidity Q max−1 provided by the book. Lastly, evidence in Sofianos (1995 , Table 7 ) of a U-shaped pattern in specialist total revenue conditioned on trade size may reflect frequent specialist undercutting on small trades and a profitable "counterparty of last resort" role on blocks.
Robustness. The robustness of a static analysis is naturally a concern. For example, in a multi-period market, what prevents liquidity demanders from repeatedly hitting cheap limit sells at p min and then -rather than paying up to hit orders further in the book -simply waiting for the book to replenish itself, and then buying more at p min ? Clearly the answer must be a strong demand for immediacy.
18 A maintained assumption is that only the specialist and the (otherwise occupied) crowd are continuously present in the market. In other words, waiting for new value traders to arrive and replenish the book must take longer than liquidity demanders are willing to wait. Such an assumption is not unreasonable for less active (e.g., non-DJIA) stocks, where the rate of both market and thus limit order arrival is slower.
A second robustness concern is the exogeneity of the volume distribution F . This concern is compounded by the fact that the average price paid on a market buy jumps discontinuously at each B = H j > 0 for j > 1. In particular, when B ≤ H j , the specialist sells up to B −Q j −1 at p j −1 , whereas once B > H j , then any liquidity he provided at p j −1 "relocates" to p j (i.e., leaving only the S j −1 in the book at p j −1 ). It is hard to imagine that a trader -if he has any flexibility -would not prefer a slightly smaller buy B = H j with a clean up price p j −1 over market orders in an interval (H j , H j + ) for at least some small . Such preferences can lead to discontinuities or mass points in F .
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Although explicitly solving for a fixed point in F given a formal optimization problem for market orders is beyond the scope of this article, Appendix B does explain how to allow for exogenous mass points.
Having thus far taken the market structure as given, I now analyze the impact of various market design issues on liquidity.
Optimal Market Design
Competition for order flow among the NYSE, crossing networks and regional exchanges -along with the organization/deregulation of exchanges in eastern Europe and in emerging markets -has led to a growing interest in the way financial markets are structured. This section considers two specific design issues. The first is the choice of tick size, and the second is the role of the specialist.
The main message is that the equilibrium liquidity of a market depends on the interaction between the specialist's strategy, the limit order book, and latent competition from the crowd. In some situations, the specialist is simply a "trader of last resort" on larger trades (i.e., when p 1 = p min ). In others, he is also the primary source of liquidity for very small orders (i.e., when p 1 < p min ). Moreover, while the specialist is the lowest cost provider of marginal liquidity [i.e., if P ∩ (v, v + r ) is non-empty], the demand for marginal liquidity at p * is reduced by inframarginal liquidity supplied by the book (i.e., limit sells below p * ). Thus, investors' market design preferencesthat is, how they evaluate trade-offs between deeper books S 1 , S 2 , . . . and lower clean up prices p * -follow directly from their differing demands for inframarginal vs. marginal liquidity, as induced by their predispositions to use different sizes of market orders.
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My main focus is the welfare impact of different market designs on active investors. After all, they -unlike the value traders, specialist, and crowd -actively need to trade. The liquidity/illiquidity of a market, once the valuation v is fixed, refers to the temporary (or noninformational) price impact of different sizes of market orders. In particular, if j * is the index for the clean up price (i.e., p j * = p * ), then I define the average ask premium above v on a market buy B, given a grid P, as
Optimal tick size
Tick size refers to the difference between adjacent prices on a grid P. The relation between tick size and liquidity is non-monotone, discontinuous, and differs across market order size. This is because the choice of tick size affects the location of prices relative to the entry points v + c/α (for value traders) and v + r (for the trading crowd). To see this, fix v and consider two possible tick sizes < with associated grids v < p 1 < v + c/α < p 1 < p 2 < p 2 < p 3 . The picture of who wins and loses on the two grids is quite complicated. Small investors submitting orders B ≤ H ( c/α p 2 −v ) ≡Ŝ 2 prefer buying at p 1 rather than p 1 , but investors submitting somewhat larger ordersŜ 2 < B ≤ H ( c/α p 2 −v ) ≡Ŝ 2 prefer trading at p 1 rather than p 2 . 20 An important caveat here is the assumption of a monopolistic specialist. Bertrand competition among multiple risk-neutral dealers leads to infinite liquidity at p 1 (and p −1 ). This article takes no stand on why the specialist has market power. It can arise innocently if market making represents a natural monopoly -that is, if only one trader is willing to stand ready continuously to commit his capital to trade at a profit less than the crowd's r -or less innocently from collusion.
The reason for this switch is that any liquidity from the specialist at p 1 "disappears" when p 1 becomes inframarginal. The picture is even more complicated for orders larger thanŜ 2 since they are partially executed at multiple prices. The liquidity-maximizing tick size can be considered both from an ex post (i.e., given a particular v) as well as from an ex ante perspective. In the ex ante case, while market participants know the realized v when they submit their orders and trade, the exchange must choose its grid P beforehand, knowing only the probability distribution over possible values v might take in the future.
Consider first very large market orders when v is known. 21 If B > S max−1 , then the specialist sells at p * = p max−1 -just low enough to deter entry by the trading crowd -after first filling any limit orders at lower prices. However, from Proposition 5, the relative contribution of depth in the (bounded) book below v +r to the average ask premium A(B, ) shrinks as B gets very large. Thus, the key to creating liquidity for very large blocks is to choose the tick size that minimizes the maximum entry-deterring price p max−1 . For example, given a price grid centered at p 0 = v with a constant tick ,
As can be seen in Figure 5 , this relation is non-monotone and discontinuous. The discontinuities arise when shrinking the tick size by a small δ causes p max−1 to jump up from the j th price above v on the P grid [i.e., where v + j < v +r ≤ v +(j +1) ] to the j +1th price on the P −δ grid [i.e., where
However, all market buys pay v + ∞ with this tick choice. This leads to a clear conflict between large institutions (which are ex ante predisposed to submit large blocks) and retail investors (who trade using smaller orders) who prefer a smaller tick size if (as seems likely) c/α < r .
Interestingly, although small investors may prefer a finer grid, even they dislike continuous pricing. Instead they want to maximize the amount the specialist undercuts the book (i.e., since the crowd is irrelevant for them as a source of liquidity). The argument is similar to the one above except that (1) v + c/α replaces v + r as the price the specialist needs to beat, and (2) the tick size must be strictly greater than (rather than equal to) c/α 2 . This second point is because the potential depth in the limit book at v + c/α is zero, whereas the crowd still provides unlimited depth even if p max = v + r .
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Although the specifics of this example clearly depend on anchoring the price grid at p 0 = v, the idea of maximizing the amount the specialist undercuts the book or the crowd carries over to price grids centered at other points.
Consider now an exchange when it chooses P. Since price grids are not easily recustomized every time v changes, the exchange's ex ante choice of a (fixed) affects the location of prices for many different v's in the future. 23 In choosing between two grids, it turns out that a very weak criterion still leads to interesting results. 23 Although the exchange does not know v when it chooses its grid P, investors do know the current v when they submit their orders. 24 Of course, only when > 2r can we guarantee that moving to a finer grid will not change pricing in intervals that already contain a price.
Figure 6
A numerical example of the relation between tick size and liquidity on mid-size trades The average ask premium A(B, ) paid on a block of 50 round lots is minimized at a tick size strictly greater than zero in a market where the stock value v = $20, the probability of a buy α = 0.5, the expected exponential volume θ = 25 round lots, the price grid is centered at p 0 = v with a constant tick size
, the crowd hurdle rate r = 3 8 (the only difference from Figure 4 ) and a submission cost c = $0.019. Figure 6 shows that my conjecture is true for at least some mid-size trades. In this figure, the average ask premium A on a market buy of B = 50 round lots is plotted as a function of in a market with the same parameterization -except for a more realistic hurdle r = 3 8 -as in Figure 4 .
Although I have focused on the liquidity demand side's welfare, the preferences of the liquidity providers over continuous versus discrete pricing are easily understood. First, value traders earn positive expected profits on inframarginal limit orders at p 1 only if p 1 > v + c/α. However, clearly p 1 < v + c/α with continuous pricing. In addition, p 1 with continuous pricing is also less than v + r , so the crowd never trades.
In contrast, the specialist's profits are actually maximized with continuous pricing. This is because as the tick size shrinks, it becomes less costly for him to undercut the book, which leads, in turn, to an endogenously thinner book in equilibrium.
Proposition 8. (1)
The cumulative depth Q(ϕ, ) at or below any price ϕ ≥ v + c/α on grids P such that ϕ ∈ P is minimized in the limit as → 0. (2) The specialist's profit for every order size B is maximized in the limit as → 0.
Specialist vs. pure limit order markets
Another policy issue concerns the pros and cons of a hybrid specialist/limit order market (as on the NYSE) versus a pure limit order market (as on the Paris Bourse). The present model provides some insights into the role and viability of the specialist as a provider of liquidity.
The first step is to explain the mechanics of how the crowd can provide residual liquidity in a pure limit order market. Large buyers will sequentially hit limit orders at prices p 1 up through p max and then -as Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) find on the Paris Bourse -post the residual at p max . The crowd sees this "distress call" and enters and submits offsetting orders to clean up.
Proposition 9. In a pure limit order market, value traders place orders until, in equilibrium, the limit order book is
and
at prices p j ≤ p max and S j = 0 thereafter.
The pure market depth S 1 is the same, given a common tick size , as in the hybrid market. However, above p 1 the cumulative depth j i=1 S i = H j on the Bourse is greater than the weighted average Q j in the hybrid market. This does not mean, however, that a pure limit order market is necessarily preferable to the hybrid market. Indeed, investors who value marginal over inframarginal liquidity strictly prefer having a specialist despite the reduced depth in the book. To see this, consider two possible cases for the tick size.
First, suppose is such that p 1 > v + c/α. Retail investors submitting small market buys B ≤ H 1 are indifferent between the two market structures since they trade at p 1 in either case. Moreover, investors with orders H 1 < B ≤ H 2 strictly prefer the hybrid market since the specialist is willing to sell up to an additional H 2 − H 1 at p 1 to undercut limit orders at p 2 . Mid-size investors' preferences are more complicated, however. Consider, for example, someone buying B = H 3 + < H 4 . In this case, the average ask premium in the pure limit order market,
is clearly (given γ 2 < 1) less than in the hybrid market,
for small enough. Of course, for a larger , this might reverse again. Thus, mid-size investors like buying up to H j +1 at prices at or below p j in the hybrid market (i.e., because the specialist undercuts orders at p j +1 ) versus only H j shares in the limit order market. However, the lower hybrid clean up price comes at the cost of reduced limit order depth at inframarginal prices p i < p * (i.e., due to their lower execution probabilities again because of specialist undercutting). For some mid-size orders, the "lower depth" effect outweighs the "lower clean up price" effect. Investors trading these quantities will thus prefer a pure limit order market's deeper book. Lastly, institutions prefer a hybrid system if their orders are large enough (i.e., given the bounded liquidity in either book) since the specialist provides unlimited liquidity for large buys at p max−1 , which is less than the p max charged by the trading crowd in the pure limit order market.
If instead is such that p 1 < v + c/α, then the large and mid-size investors' preferences are qualitatively unchanged. However, retail investors submitting very small orders B ≤ H j min s will like the fact that the specialist undercuts the book at p min by selling at p min−1 on their trades. Thus, under these conditions, small retail investors strictly prefer a hybrid market.
So far, these comparisons assume that the tick size is the same in the two markets. Actually, a stronger result is possible.
Proposition 10. (1) In a pure limit order market, the average ask premium is minimized for all B with continuous pricing. (2) A hybrid market with any discrete tick min(c/α, r ) > > 0 ex ante dominates a pure limit order market with continuous pricing for, simultaneously, very small orders B → 0 and very large orders B → ∞.
Since neither market mechanism dominates the other across all order sizes, which one will prevail is an interesting topic for future research. It appears, though, that small retail and large institutional investors would both lobby for a hybrid structure -even if this involves some specialist market power -as the preferred "second best" when competition among multiple risk-neutral dealers is infeasible.
Price Discovery
This section generalizes the basic model to allow [as in Rock (1996) ] for price discovery due to market order flows that are informative. In broad terms, the main insight is that the underlying logic and tractability of the analysis carry over in this richer setting. There are, however, at least a few empirically testable qualitative differences. First, the interplay between price discovery and liquidity provision leads to the possibility of both (1) partial execution (and hence inframarginal prof-itability) of limit sells above p 1 and (2) actual trading by the crowd. Second, in contrast to Proposition 4, increasing the probability of large informative orders does not necessarily induce a deeper book. Third, the book may now have "holes" in it -that is, prices with zero depth S j = 0 even though higher and lower prices have positive depth.
Consider a market identical to the one above except that the conditional value of the stock is now a non-decreasing continuous function v(B) of the size of the arriving market buy B. Let αF (x, y) be the cumulative probability of a buy x < B ≤ y and µ(x, y) the expected value of v(B) conditional on x < B ≤ y, and define αF (y) and µ(y) analogously for B > y. Prices . . . , p −2 , p −1 , p 1 , p 2 , . . . on a grid P are indexed relative to the zero-volume valuation v(0). If a price on P equals v(0), it is indexed as p 0 . Define the limit depth S j , cumulative depth Q j , and submission cost c as above.
One other change is a new priority rule protecting market orders. In particular, I assume that the specialist cannot "front run" arriving market orders in that, as public orders, they have priority in trading with the limit book. This rule prevents the specialist from cleaning out limit sells at prices below v(B) ahead of a market order B.
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The specialist once again exercises market power subject to competition from the value traders, the crowd, and the obligations of price, public order, and time priority. In trading off price and quantity, his profit also depends on B through the conditional value v(B). Given B and a limit book S 1 , S 2 , . . ., he picks the clean up price p * to solve
where the total selling by rival liquidity providers, given the trading crowd's reservation price p max (B), is
The first branch in Equation (28) is the specialist's profit from liquidity provision (i.e., selling at p * ), while the second allows for the possibility of his buying from the book (e.g., cleaning out excess liquidity) at successively higher prices p j < v(B) if B < Q j .
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The crowd's reservation price p max is now a function of B, which they (along with the specialist) also see. In particular, given B, the crowd is willing to provide liquidity by selling B − i s.t. p i ≤p * S i whenever p * ≥ v(B) + r . 27 As in Section 1, the potential entry by the crowd at p max (B) [i.e., the lowest price at or above v(B) + r ] effectively constrains the specialist to set p * to be no more than p max−1 (B) [i.e., the highest price below v(B) + r ] if he wants positive volume. Since it is sometimes more convenient to work with constraints expressed in terms of B, let κ j be the volume that solves v(κ j ) + r = p j . In other words, κ j is the cutoff for B such that when B > κ j , selling at p j undercuts the crowd's p max (B) .
Value traders are still Bertrand competitors with stochastic arrival times. They submit limit orders until the marginal expected profit at each price p j is driven to zero (if S j > 0) or is non-positive (if S j = 0). In so doing, they recognize the interaction between limit order execution and stock values. While larger orders B lead to execution of limit sells at higher prices, they also imply higher valuations v(B) for the stock sold. In particular, a limit sell at p j is profitably executed if and only if -given the monotonicity of v -it is executed against an order B < β j , where β j solves v(β j ) = p j . Thus, the marginal expected profit for a limit sell at p j is
where Z − j is the set of volumes B ≤ β j such that limit sells at p j are executed in full and F (Z − j ) is its associated probability, and where the set Z + j and probability F (Z + j ) are defined analogously for B > β j . Thus, the three terms in Equation (30) Proposition 11 shows that, in equilibrium, this is never optimal. In addition, the specialist clearly never buys from the crowd, as they are both discretionary traders and thus cannot simultaneously profit on a trade. 27 Liquidity provision from the crowd is now limited rather than infinite at a price p since larger orders B can move v(B) + r above p.
Figure 7 A simple example of the specialist's profit function
The curves π j −1 (B) and π j (B) illustrate the specialist's profit for different possible volumes B in the case where Q j −1 ≥ κ j −1 and Q j ≥ κ j (i.e., the cumulative depths both exceed the respective cutoffs for undercutting the crowd at p j −1 and p j ). They are zero at volumes β j −1 and β j , where the respective valuations equal the prices p j −1 and p j . The crossing point S j −1,j is the volume where the two profit levels are equal.
The analysis can be simplified with two preliminary results. The first is an immediate implication of Equation (30).
Proposition 11. In equilibrium, the cumulative depths satisfy Q j ≤ β j , and thus the specialist never buys from the limit order book. This lets us ignore the bottom branch of Equation (28) because if B < Q j , then v(B) < p j , and the specialist is unwilling to buy at a loss at p j to make up any shortfall Q j − B. Thus, he either defers to the book/crowd (i.e., does not trade) by setting p * = p j or he actively provides liquidity (i.e., sells) by undercutting the book/crowd at p v(B) ] when selling at p j has two important properties, as illustrated in Figure 7 . First, the function π j is initially increasing in B, 28 but is eventually pulled to zero as v(B) → p j and stays negative thereafter. Second, its slope
dB (B − Q j ) is increasing in p j . Thus, despite their non-monotonicity, each pair of profit functions π j and π k (i.e., given prices p j = p k ) has at most one positive crossing point S j,k . This single crossing property leads to our next result.
Proposition 12. In equilibrium, if B > B , then p
Monotonicity of the clean up price p * (B) again implies the existence of execution thresholdsŜ 1 ≤Ŝ 2 ≤ . . ., whereŜ j = inf(B ≥ Q j | p * ≥ p j ) as in Equation (7). With informative orders, however, these execution thresholds no longer necessarily equal the price thresholds S * j = inf(B | p * ≥ p j ) since partial execution of limit sells above p 1 cannot be ruled out now. In particular, any time B > β j−1 [i.e., so that v(B) > p j−1 ], the specialist cannot profitably undercut limit sells at p j and thus must defer to the book even if
Accordingly, e sj can be rewritten in terms of the thresholdsŜ 1 , S 2 , . . . . Since the full execution of S j depends on whether B >Ŝ j , the marginal expected profit at p j simplifies to
Depth S j influences the marginal profit e sj only indirectly via the thresholdŜ j . Thus, to determine the equilibrium depth of the limit book, we need the relation between the S j 's andŜ j 's. As in Section 3, the execution thresholdsŜ j are closely related to the adjacent price crossing points S j −1,j . Once again, the crossing point S j −1,j is found by comparing -given an order B > Q j -the specialist's profit from selling at p j ,
with the profit from selling at p j −1 ,
Thus, π j > π j−1 if and only if
where now -unlike in the uninformative order flow case -the RHS also depends on B via v(B). Combining Equation (34) and the uniqueness of the crossing point for π j and π j −1 gives the following implicit definition:
Two considerations may prevent the specialist from setting a thresholdŜ j equal to S j −1,j . First, he must also undercut the trading crowd to win any volume. In particular, if S j −1,j ≤ κ j , then his share of buys S j −1,j ≤ B ≤ κ j would be zero at p * = p j . To avoid this, the specialist strategically sets p * -provided that B < β j−1 -to undercut the crowd at p j . Second, if β j −1 < max(Q j , κ j ), then there is no price p > v(B) for the specialist to use to undercut the book's/crowd's willingness to sell at p j on buys β j −1 < B < max(Q j , κ j ). Under these conditions, he simply steps aside and lets such B's cross with the book/crowd. 29 Thus, now the crowd may actually trade as an active (rather than merely latent) source of liquidity.
Proposition 13. In equilibrium, each thresholdŜ j is determined by one of four cases. First, at price p 1 , the threshold isŜ 1 = S 1 . Second, at prices p j > p 1 , where κ j ≤ 0, the threshold iŝ
Third, at prices p j > p 1 , where 0 < κ j < β j−1 , then
Fourth, at prices p j > p 1 , where β j −1 < κ j , then
The specialist profit function in Figure 8 illustrates the logic behind these cases. As in Figure 7 , the profit from selling at different prices is plotted for various possible B's, given the hypothetical cumulative depths Q 1 , Q 2 , . . .. For small buys B ≤ Q 1 , the specialist cannot (in this example) undercut the book so he simply defers to it. He sells to larger B's at p 1 until the crossing point S 1,2 , where he switches to p 2 . Since limit sells at p 3 cannot be profitably undercut on still larger buys β 2 < B ≤ Q 3 [i.e., since β 2 < B implies p 2 < v(B)], the possibility of partial execution of S 3 meansŜ 3 = Q 3 . Buys B ≥ Q 4 are examples of the third case in Proposition 13. Selling at p 5 (rather than p 4 ) would 29 This just generalizes what happens at p 1 . Geometrically, β j −1 < Q j corresponds to a negativeprofit crossing point S j −1,j to the left of Q j . In addition, it does not matter whether F (Ŝ j , β j ) and µ(Ŝ j , β j ) in Equation (31) are defined with S j executing only when B >Ŝ j (i.e., as when the specialist trades) or when B ≥Ŝ j = Q j (i.e., when the specialist defers to the book) since, once again, with a continuous distribution F , they are the same.
Figure 8
A more complicated example of the specialist's profit function This figure illustrates each of the possible ways execution thresholdsŜ j can be determined when market orders B are informative. A generic π j function gives the specialist's profit if he could sell at price p j after first executing all Q j limit sells at or below price p j without regard to whether p j undercuts the crowd's reservation price p max (B) . The specialist's optimal strategy is the upper envelope of the π functions subject to a constraint that he has positive volume at p j only if B is greater than κ j [i.e., where v(κ j ) + r = p j ] so that selling at p j undercuts the crowd. The π j functions each equal zero at a volume β j where v(β j ) = p j . The crossing points S j −1,j are the volumes such that the profit from selling at p j −1 and p j are equal. One idiosyncrasy in this example is that the tick sizes are unequal since κ 5 < β 4 but β 6 < κ 7 implies that p 5 − p 4 < p 7 − p 6 . This is simply to illustrate two particular cases that depend on different relative ordering of β j −1 and κ j . seem to be the natural alternative to p 3 (since this book happens to be empty at p 5 ) except that the crowd would enter and supply all of the residual demand at p 5 whenever B ≤ κ 5 . Thus, the threshold for p 5 isŜ 5 = κ 5 rather than S 3,5 . The rest of the figure is self-explanatory until β 6 < B < κ 7 . Here, the crowd is willing to sell at p 7 , but the specialist cannot profitably undercut them by selling at p 6 [i.e., since B > β 6 implies p 6 < v(B)], so he has no choice but to defer to them. Thus,Ŝ 7 = β 6 , which illustrates the fourth case in Proposition 13.
Value traders again submit orders in equilibrium until the execution thresholdsŜ j are high enough to eliminate any marginal expected profit in the book. Of course, if the marginal profit e sj is negative to start with (i.e., given S j = 0), then the book stays empty at p j . At this point, it is helpful to introduce an analogue G j to H j in Equation (11). In particular, using the fact that F (g, β j )[p j − µ(g, β j )] from Equation (31) is continuous and strictly decreasing in g ∈ [0, β j ] -which implies that its inverse g j exists and is continuous and decreasinglet G j be the non-negative "zero" (where possible) of the marginal profit condition
The new trick with informative orders is that Proposition 13 does not (unlike Proposition 2) guarantee positive depth at each p j < p max , where S j −1 > 0. Rather it only implies that S j > 0 if and only if G j (i.e., the potential threshold) is larger than a minimum floor,
reflecting competition from the crowd. In particular, at prices where e sj (Ŝ . At prices with positive depth above p 1 , we substituteŜ j = G j into Proposition 13 to get the corresponding depth
Proposition 14. In a market with informative order flows, the equilibrium limit book is 
The equilibrium is once again unique since (as in Section 3) it is constructed recursively. The solution is also still "almost" analytic -now up to the evaluation of the inverse conditional expectations G j . Proposition 3 for uninformative orders is clearly a special case of Proposition 14, where v(B) = v and G j = H j . Although I have not found any closed-form examples, numerical solutions are easily calculated. For example, Figure 9 shows the sell depths and thresholds on an eighths grid centered at p 0 = $20 when volume is uniformly distributed on [0, 50] round lots, α = 0.5, c = .019, r = .125, and the updating function is v(B) = 20 + .00275B.
Two special cases deserve comment. If the crowd's reservation profit r is less than the tick size , then the equilibrium is again "competitive" in that p * (B) is simply the lowest price p j above v(B).
This follows from Equation (44) and the fact that if r < , then max(0, min(β j −1 , κ j )) = max(0, β j−1 ) [i.e., since
The book/crowd sells at p j to buys β j −1 < B ≤ κ j (i.e., the specialist steps aside), and the book/specialist sells at p j to buys κ j < B < β j (i.e., to undercut the crowd at p j +1 ).
At the other extreme, as r → ∞, the crowd becomes irrelevant (i.e., lim r →∞ κ j < 0 for all j ), and only the book and the specialist provide liquidity. In this case, the thresholdsŜ j are determined exclusively by Equation (36).
One complication with informative orders is that the limit book can have "holes" in it (e.g., S 5 = S 7 = 0 in Figure 8 ) if theŜ j ≥ S floor j constraint is binding. Nonetheless, the cumulative depth Q j from Equation (43) is still a weighted average -now of the G 1 , . . . , G j at prices with nonzero depths
where I = {i | e si (Ŝ floor i ) ≥ 0} are the indices corresponding to positive depths in the book.
Once again, this implies bounded cumulative depth in the book across all grids P. However, the possibility of holes complicates the details of the upper bound. In particular, given any valuation v ≥ v(0), Unlike in Proposition 4, the volume distribution F 's effect on depth is ambiguous now. To see why, consider two distributions where F first-order stochastic dominates F . Let S j andŜ j be the depth and threshold, respectively, at p j for F and define S j andŜ j analogously for F . On the one hand, increasing the probability of large orders x at the expense of small orders y, whereŜ j < y < x reduces the probability of high profit/low loss execution of limit sells (i.e., when B = y) and increases the probability of lower profit/higher loss execution (i.e., when B = x) at all prices at or below p j . This has two opposing effects on the depth S j relative to S j . Holding Q j −1 fixed at Q j −1 , limit sells at p j are less profitable [i.e., e sj (Ŝ j ) ≤ e sj (Ŝ j ) ≤ 0], which tends to lower S j . However, the reduced profitability of limit sells below p j leads to a lower cumulative depth Q j −1 , which tends to increase S j . While the net effect on depth S j is unclear givenŜ j < y < x, the effect on cumulative depth, Q j ≤ Q j , is unambiguous.
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On the other hand, increasing the probability of large orders x at the expense of small y whenŜ j −1 < y <Ŝ j < x < β j leads to greater depth, S j ≥ S j , for two reasons. First, it reduces the probability of nonexecution of the marginal limit sell at p j (i.e., when B = y) and increases the probability of profitable execution (i.e., when B = x). If e sj (Ŝ j ) > 0 with this shift, then additional limit sells will be posted at p j until the new marginal profit is driven to zero. Second, the depth S j may also increase due to a lower cumulative depth Q j −1 since shifting probability from y to x also reduces (from above) the profitability and thus cumulative depth at prices below p j . However, while the effect on S j is unambiguous, S j ≥ S j , now the net effect on cumulative depth Q j is unclear.
The last result in this section is that the adverse selection problem vis-a-vis informed orders produces a bid/ask spread around v(0) even when the up-front costs c are zero. This is different from the uninformative order case in Section 2, where c > 0 is necessary to make "room" for the specialist's market power.
p j when market orders are more informative. In particular, if there is enough probability in F concentrated just below G j then G j will be only slightly less than G j . However, if v(G j ) v (G j ), then it is possible from Equation (42) to have γ j enough larger than γ j to offset the effect of the slightly lower G j in Equation (45). The reason is that the higher v(G j ) makes undercutting limit sells at p j less attractive to the specialist, as reflected in the larger γ j . 33 To see this, suppose 
Optimal Market Design (Revisited)
The earlier market design analysis carries over almost directly to informative market orders. This section briefly reconsiders first, the relation between tick size and liquidity and second, the pros and cons of pure limit order versus hybrid specialist/limit order markets.
Optimal tick size
The key to the liquidity-maximizing tick size ∞ for large uninformative buys B was to choose to maximize the amount by which the specialist had to undercut the crowd's reservation price p max . We could ignore the effect of on inframarginal liquidity because cumulative depth in the book below v + r was bounded and thus unimportant for the average ask premium A(B, ) as B → ∞. With informative orders, however, larger B's imply higher valuations v(B) and thus higher reservation prices p max (B) . If this were to cause an ever-increasing number of limit orders at progressively higher prices to execute, then the weight attached to the inframarginal limit orders in A(B, ) might not go to zero as B → 0.
34 Fortunately, this is unlikely to be a problem. If we now take v(0) to be random -as it is from the exchange's perspective when it chooses P -then regardless of the distribution over possible v (0) Consider next very small orders. As in Section 4, the key is to find the lowest price from competing liquidity providers that the specialist needs to beat. Given a particular v(0), no limit sells are posted below the ϕ book from Proposition 17. In addition, the crowd's lowest reservation price is ϕ cr owd = v(0) + r . Putting these together, define ϕ min = min(ϕ book , ϕ cr owd ). Thus, the specialist cannot ask more than ϕ min and still undercut his competition on small trades B → 0. Now, taking future v(0)'s as random variables -and allowing for possible dependence of F and 
Hybrid vs. pure limit-order markets.
The trading crowd may still undercut limit orders even in the absence of a specialist. However, since their undercutting is nonstrategic, the Bourse-style equilibrium with informative market orders is still simple.
Proposition 21. In a pure limit order market with price discovery, the equilibrium limit book is
and the corresponding thresholds arê
if j > 1 and e sj (max(0, κ j−1 )) ≥ 0 max(0, κ j−1 ) if j > 1 and e sj (max(0, κ j−1 )) < 0.
(48)
Aside from the substitution of G's (inverse conditional expectations) for H 's (inverse distributions), the relationship between the pure and hybrid equilibria in Proposition 21 and 14 roughly parallels that between Proposition 9 and 3. There are, however, a few subtleties. Since max(0, κ j−1 ) in Equation (48) is less thanŜ floor j in Equation (40), the pure limit order book may have positive depth at prices where the hybrid book is empty. The reason for the lower floor in the pure limit order market is that the crowd undercuts the book at p j only by selling at p j −1 , whereas in the hybrid market, it can preempt the specialist simply by matching him at p j . Nonetheless, "holes" are still possible in the pure limit book, so that the cumulative depth is
rather than always G j [as the parallel with Equation (25) might suggest].
The answer to the market design question of who prefers pure versus hybrid markets is qualitatively the same as in Section 3. Small investors still like the specialist's superior marginal liquidity on small trades (i.e., if ϕ min > p 1 , he sells at p min−1 to sufficiently small B's). Similarly, institutional investors again benefit -given that the pure book is also bounded for the same reasons as in Proposition 18 -from the specialist's undercutting the trading crowd on very large market orders. Some mid-size investors, however, once again prefer the pure limit order market's greater inframarginal depth over the hybrid market's lower (marginal) clean up price.
Conclusion
This article has used a single-period microstructure model to study the economics of liquidity provision. Since limit orders are an important competing source of liquidity on the NYSE and other exchanges, it is important to understand how effective such orders are in disciplining the exercise of market power by specialists.
The main contributions of this article are first, a tractable framework in which to study these issues including analytic solutions in some special cases; second, an analysis of large and small investors' preferences over the tick size; and third, an explanation of which types of investors prefer NYSE-style hybrid specialist/limit order markets and which prefer Paris Bourse-style pure limit order markets. The analysis also suggests a number of directions for future work:
1. The Bertrand assumption for value traders could be relaxed. One interesting case to consider is a market with a single strategic value trader (e.g., for low-volume stocks). In this case, the specialist and the value trader both have bilateral (although not identical) market power. Another case is a market where (a) the total number of value traders is random, and (b) they leave immediately after posting their order. Now the market power of a value trader is random, since he submits his orders without knowing whether more limit orders will be submitted after him (in which case, his market power is ex post diminished) or not. The result is a random limit order book depending on the realized number of value traders. Comparisons of pure and hybrid markets would be particularly interesting when the book is random. It is precisely when the limit book is thin -and investors most need someone to undercut the book and the crowd -that the specialist's incentives to offer price improvement are weakest.
2. The effect of randomness in the limit order book on market liquidity could also be studied by adding optimizing traders with liquidity shocks who use limit orders, as well as market orders as in Kumar and Seppi (1994) .
3. An important extension is endogenizing the distribution F and (even more ambitiously) the updating rule v(B) by making market orders elastic with respect to price. Market design comparisons could then take feedback effects of the design choice on F and v(B) into account. In particular, the updating rule v(B) in a pure limit order market will differ from that of a hybrid market because of differences in informed trading [i.e., due to their differing non-informational price impacts A(B)], and also because of the differential incentives to acquire more precise information when information acquisition is endogenous.
4. On the empirical side, estimating the model and testing its consistency with patterns in specialist participation rates and profits appears promising.
Proof of Proposition 3. From Equation (1), the specialist never sells for less than p 1 or more than p max−1 (henceŜ max = ∞). Given price, public, and time priority, the marginal limit sell at p 1 goes unexecuted only if B < S 1 . Hence, S 1 is either zero [i.e., if e s1 (0) ≤ 0 for F (B > 0) = 1 because p 1 ≤ v +c/α] or can be found by inverting e s1 (S 1 ) = 0. At p j > p 1 , the specialist executes the S j limit orders if and only if B >Ŝ j = S j −1,j from Proposition 2. Hence, S j again is either zero (i.e., if p j ≤ v + c/α) or is found recursively from Equation (9) by setting e sj = 0 and inverting to get
The form of Q j −1 follows from recursive substitution of the preceding equation. The form ofŜ j in Equation (15) Proof of Proposition 5. From Equation (13), the cumulative depth Q j below ϕ on any P is a weighted average of the intervening H 's. Thus, since H i is increasing in p i from Equation (11), Q j is bounded by H j , the largest H included in the average.
Proof of Proposition 6. For each possible v, the cumulative depth at prices p i < v + r is bounded from Proposition 5 by H ( c/α r ) so that as B → ∞, the relative contribution of limit orders goes to zero in A( , B). Thus, liquidity for each v is primarily determined by p max−1 (v) for large buys B and the analogous entry-deterring bid for large sells S. Note that if < r 2 , then for each possible v, the corresponding intervals (v, v + r ) and (v − r, v) each contain at least two prices on the grid. Doubling the tick size to 2 eliminates every other price while ensuring (since 2 < r) that at least one price from the original grid remains. Thus, for each possible v, the entrydeterring buy and sell prices are either unchanged or possibly (one or both) improved by . A fortiori, if the doubled tick 2 is itself less than r/2, then doubling yet again may further improve liquidity.
Continue doubling until the new tick B satisfies r 2 ≤ B < r . Since this last grid has at most two prices (but at least one) from the original grid in each interval, the buy and sell entry-deterring prices in any interval cannot be worse and may possibly be better. A similar procedure involving halving the tick size can be used to improve liquidity, given an excessively coarse grid with > 2r.
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof uses the same halving and doubling logic as in Proposition 6 except that c/α replaces r .
Proof of Proposition 8.
Step 1: Fix any value v and price ϕ > v + c/α. I first show that the limit of cumulative depth Q(ϕ, ), on a grid P with tick size > 0 such that ϕ is on P , exists as → 0. Recursive substitution of p j, = v + (j − 1 + q) in Equation (13) gives Q(ϕ, ) = qH (p 1, )+···+H (p n, ) n−1+q
. Taking the limit gives
where the first equality follows because ϕ−v = 1 n−1+q , and the existence of the Riemann integral follows from the fact that H (p) = H ( c/α p−v ) is a continuous (weakly) increasing function of p. The uniqueness of the integral means that the limit does not depend on our choice of the initial tick .
The second part of step 1 is to show that refinements of any tick size > 0 such that ϕ ∈ P decrease cumulative depth. To see why, consider any two price grids P and P /2 with tick sizes > 0 and /2 such that ϕ is on P (and thus P /2 ). Let n and n be the number of prices between v and ϕ on the two grids and let q and q be the fraction of a tick between v and the first prices on the two grids, respectively. Each price p j on P equals some price p k, /2 on P /2 . In particular, if halving adds a new price between v and v + q , then k = 2j . If not, then k = 2j − 1. The cumulative depths Q(ϕ, ) and Q(ϕ, /2) can be found recursively from Equation (13). Starting at p 1 on P , if p 1, /2 = p 1 , then Q(p 1 , /2) = H (p 1 ) = H ( ≤ H (p 1 ) = Q(p 1 , ). Suppose now by induction that Q(p j −1 , /2) ≤ Q(p j−1 , ) at price p j −1 . On the P grid, the cumulative depth at p j is Q(p j , ) = γ j H (p j )+(1−γ j )Q(p j −1 , ), while on P /2 , it is Q(p j , /2) = γ k H (p j ) + (1 − γ k )γ k−1 H (p j − /2) + (1 − γ k )(1 − γ k−1 )Q(p j −1 , /2). Notice, however, that γ j = 1 j −1+q and γ k + (1 − γ k )γ k−1 = 2 k−1+q . If we substitute in k = 2j and q = 1+q 2 when p 2, /2 = p 1 [i.e., since in this case, p 1 −v = q = (1+q ) 2 = p 2, /2 −v] or k = 2j −1 and q = q /2 when p 1, /2 = p 1 (i.e., since then p 1 −v = q = q 2 = p 1, /2 −v), then we see that γ j = γ k + (1 − γ k )γ k−1 and thus -since H (p j − /2) ≤ H (p j ) -that Q(p j , /2) ≤ Q(p j , ) at each p j up through and including p j = ϕ. Thus, refinements of any grid P such that ϕ ∈ P reduce cumulative depth.
Step 2: The specialist's profit π(p * ) is maximized in the limit as → 0 for two reasons. First, shrinking increases the number of possible clean up prices in the set [v, v + r ] ∩ P from which he chooses. Second, for any order B and fixed price p, shrinking the tick size minimizes Q(p) and thus maximizes the specialist's share B − Q(p) in the limit given p * = p.
Proof of Proposition 9. This follows from recursively setting e sj = 0 at prices p min and above, but now takingŜ j = j i=1 S i in Equation (9).
Proof of Proposition 10.
Step 1: From Equation (25), adding a new price p between p j −1 and p j does not affect the cumulative depth Q j but does shift H (p ) − H (p j −1 ) in depth down from p j to p , provided p > v + c/α.
Step 2: Given min(c/α, r ) > > 0, the specialist undercuts hybrid limit sells at p min by selling up to H (p min ) > 0 shares at p min−1 , which is less than the lowest pure limit sell at v + c/α. Similarly, on large orders, the specialist sells B − Q max−1 at p max−1 , while in the pure market, B − H (p max ) is bought from the crowd at p max . If B is large enough, the lower hybrid clean up price results in a lower average ask premium A, given the bounded depth available in the book in either market.
Proof of Proposition 11. Suppose not, so that Q j > β j for some p j . If S j > 0, then in equilibrium, e sj = 0, which from Equation (30), implies a nonzero probability of profitable execution for the S j limit sells, or F (Z − j ) > 0. Since limit sells at p j are profitably executed only when B < β j [i.e., when v(B) < p j ], this implies that for such B's, the specialist must buy at p j (i.e., given the prohibition on front running) to make up the shortfall Q j −B. This is a contradiction, however, since the specialist would be unwilling to buy at a loss. Similarly, if S j = 0, consider the highest price p k < p j such that S k > 0. Since Q k = Q j , we have Q k > β j . Again, for a limit sell at p k to be profitably executed, then there are B's such thatŜ j > B > κ j , where p * (B) = max(p * | B < S j ) = p k < p j . Since p j already undercuts the crowd when B > κ j , and since S j = 0 [i.e., since e sj (Ŝ j ) ≤ e sj (κ j ) < 0], pricing at p k just belowŜ j must let the specialist undercut a limit sell S i > 0 at some p i , where p k < p i ≤ p j −1 . Price priority implies then thatŜ i =Ŝ j and thus that 0 = e si (Ŝ j ) < e sj (Ŝ j ) (i.e., since S i > 0), which, however, contradicts e sj (Ŝ j ) ≤ e sj (κ j ) < 0. Thus,Ŝ j = κ j .
Case 3. If instead e sj (κ j ) > 0 > e sj (β j −1 ) and 0 < κ j < β j−1 , then S j > κ j . In addition,Ŝ j = S j −1,j . To see why, notice first that ifŜ j <Ŝ j +1 , thenŜ j is determined by a crossing point S k,j with some p k ≤ p j −1 . If p k < p j−1 , then it must be that the specialist is using p k to undercut at least one S i > 0 at some price p k < p i ≤ p j −1 . However, since this implies thatŜ i =Ŝ j , we have 0 = e si (Ŝ j ) < e sj (Ŝ j ), which is a contradiction. Thus, ifŜ j <Ŝ j +1 , then p k = p j −1 , so thatŜ j = S j −1,j . If insteadŜ j =Ŝ j +1 , then for B's such that κ j < B <Ŝ j , the specialist must be setting p * (B) = p m < p j to undercut at least one S i > 0 at some p m < p i ≤ p j . However,Ŝ i =Ŝ j +1 (from price priority) implies then that 0 = e si (Ŝ j+1 ) < e sj+1 (Ŝ j+1 ), which is a contradiction. Thus, we must haveŜ j <Ŝ j +1 , and thus (from above)Ŝ j = S j −1,j .
Case 4. If κ j ≤ 0, then, as in Case 3 (above), the crowd does not constrain the specialist's use of price p j , and the same argument shows thatŜ j = S j −1,j .
Proof of Proposition 14. The proof for S 1 andŜ 1 is in the body of the article, so consider prices p j > p 1 . Given the threshold floorŜ ) ≥ 0, then S j > 0, and we can invert the value traders' zero-profit condition e sj (Ŝ j ) = 0 to getŜ j = G j . Substituting this into Proposition 13 and solving for S j gives Equation (43).
Proof of Proposition 15. Since the cumulative depth p i ≤ϕ S i is a (positive) weighted average of G's corresponding to prices (with positive depth) at or below ϕ, it is bounded by G ϕ v , the largest possible positive G for any grid P.
Proof of Proposition 16. First, note that the e sj are weakly decreasing in the valuation v(B) [due to µ(x, y) and µ(x)] and in c/α. Thus, the inverse g j and G j also inherit this property. Thus, the execution
